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TURKEY’S ACCESSION TO THE CISG:
THE SIGNIFICANCE FOR TURKEY
AND FOR SALES TRANSACTIONS
WITH U.S. CONTRACTING PARTIES
William P. Johnson*
Abstract
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) entered into force for Turkey on August 1, 2011. This article considers the
significance of Turkey’s accession to the CISG as part of Turkey’s continuing
engagement with systems of international trade, especially as relates to sales
transactions with U.S. contracting parties. This article urges the Turkish bar to
recognize that the CISG is a viable alternative to various potentially applicable bodies of
domestic sales law, and the article offers some guidance regarding proper understanding
and application of the CISG. This article also offers comparative analysis of some of the
most important differences – and similarities – between the CISG and Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, the primary domestic sales law in force in the United States,
including analysis of the broad freedom of contract contained in each.
Keywords: CISG, freedom of contract, international sales law, international
trade, Uniform Commercial Code
INTRODUCTION
“Turkey is at a crossroads.”1 So claimed Eric Rouleau in 1996 in the context of
analyzing the challenges presented by Turkey’s management of its domestic conflict with
the Kurdish Workers’ Party, its joining of the European Customs Union, and its evolving
relationship with the United States following the fall of the Iron Curtain. 2 Some fifteen
years later, the crossroads remains, at least in some respects.
Significantly, although Turkey entered into a customs union with the European
Union in 1995, it continues to feel its way along the path to EU membership. Turkey
obtained status as an EU candidate country more than ten years ago (in December 1999)
and entered formal accession negotiations more than five years ago (in October 2005),
but it is not yet an EU member state.3 While Turkey has made progress toward EU
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1
Eric Rouleau, Turkey: Beyond Atatürk, FOREIGN POL’Y, Summer 1996, at 70, 70.
2
See id. at 71-87.
3
See European Commission, Commission Staff, Turk. 2010 Progress Rep. accompany’g the Commc’n
from the Comm’n to the Eur. Parl. & the Council – Enlargement Strategy & Main Challenges 2010-2011,
§ 1.2, SEC(2010) 1327 (Nov. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Turkey 2010 Progress Report].

© 2011 William P. Johnson

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1947587

WPJ DRAFT – 8/18/2011

membership, it still has work to do, and it experiences setbacks from time to time, some
of its own making. 4
The recent arrest of members of the Turkish press who are associated with the
opposition in Turkey is one troubling example of a setback. 5 While Turkish prosecutors
have asserted that the journalists are involved in criminal attempts to overthrow the
government (through the organization Ergenekon), critics claim that that is merely a
pretext for politically motivated oppression by the government.6 In fact, the UN Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a statement criticizing the lack of
transparency in the arrests, and expressing concern that the arrests might be politically
motivated and constitute a violation of international law.7 Such setbacks hinder Turkey’s
full participation in international legal systems, including those relating to international
trade and commerce. Nevertheless, on balance Turkey appears resolved to continue to
proceed down the path of harmonizing its law with international trade law and engaging
with the international system of trade and commerce.
One important recent development is Turkey’s accession to the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),8 a step of potential
significance in the continuing improvement of the legal framework in which international
trade in goods takes place. As such, Turkey has made an important decision to play a
role in the continuing effort to promote the development of, and to remove barriers to,
international trade. This is not the first or the last step Turkey will take, but it is an
important step for Turkey and for its trading partners, including the United States.
Fifteen years ago, in reference to Turkey’s entry into the customs union with the
European Union, Rouleau asserted that “[b]ringing Turkish laws into compliance with
those of the EU [would] create a homogenous and stable environment that in turn should
provide the necessary security for Turkey’s private sector to thrive.”9 Similarly today,
bringing Turkey’s sales law into conformity with the emerging dominant body of
international sales law in the international system of trade will increase predictability and
promote uniformity in respect of international contracts entered into by Turkish buyers
and sellers. That increased predictability and uniformity will reduce uncertainty,
decrease transaction costs, and allow international trade and commerce involving Turkish
buyers and sellers to thrive.
And of course there is potentially more than Turkey’s continuing legal and
economic growth and development at stake. Turkey has the ability to play an important
role and to wield meaningful influence in its region. As Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and
4

See generally id.
See, e.g., Sebnem Arsu, 7 More Journalists Detained in Turkey, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2011.
6
See id.
7
U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, UN rights office calls on Turkey to ensure press
freedom
after
journalists’
arrest
(Mar.
15,
2011),
available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/printnews.asp?nid=37766 (last visited Mar. 17, 2011).
8
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened for signature Apr.
11, 1980, S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 668 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988)
[hereinafter CISG].
9
Rouleau, supra note 1, at 81.
5
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other parts of North Africa and the Middle East experience political and social
upheaval, 10 the international community should focus intently on how best to bring
stability to the region, not only in the near-term future, but also with respect to the long
term. Part of the recipe for stability will certainly involve attention to the rule of law,
democracy, and human rights.11 But robust trade and commerce can contribute to
economic stability, and economic stability in turn has the potential to help reduce sources
of unrest. This can ultimately contribute to supporting the rule of law and bolstering the
democratic process. After all, “‘[d]emocracy is bad news for terrorists.’”12 Turkey can
play an important role in contributing to that stability.
I. TURKEY AND TRADE
A. Turkey’s Role in International Trade
Turkey’s role in international trade is already significant. Its significance is due
to the size of its economy and its volume of trade; its active involvement with
international organizations; and its influence in the region. With the seventeenth largest
economy in the world, 13 Turkey is an important and influential actor in world trade and
commerce, and its significance seems only to be increasing.14
1. Trade with the European Union
A member of the European customs unions and a formal candidate for
membership in the European Union, a large percentage of Turkey’s total trade is with EU
member states. In fact, total trade with EU member states in 2010 was €103,211,000,000
(more than one hundred three billion euro),15 making Turkey one of the EU’s largest
trading partners. At the same time, however, despite Turkey’s customs union with the
European Union, the European Commission has recently concluded that Turkey’s
“[t]echnical barriers to trade are still hampering free movement of goods”16 and, perhaps
of even greater concern, that “new barriers have been added in areas such as
pharmaceuticals and construction products.”17 Still, the European Commission also
recognized that the European Union’s customs union with Turkey “continues to

10

See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Libyans do what West would not, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 5, 2011, at 2.
See, e.g., Chris Arsenault, Brazil’s ‘lessons’ for Arab rebels, AL JAZEERA, Mar. 4, 2011, available at
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2011/03/201134183658331534.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2011).
12
Scott Shane, As Regimes Fall in Arab World, Al Qaeda Sees History Fly By, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011
(quoting Paul R. Pillar).
13
See The World Factbook, Country Comparison: GDP (2010), CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2011).
14
See Landon Thomas Jr., Turning East, Turkey Asserts Economic Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2010.
15
See EU Bilateral Trade & Trade with the World, Turkey, at 3 (Mar. 17, 2011), available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113456.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
16
Turkey 2010 Progress Report, supra note 3, § 4.1.
17
Id.
11
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contribute to the enhancement of EU-Turkey bilateral trade ….”18 And the fact remains
that Turkey is the European Union’s seventh biggest trading partner.19
While trade with the European Union accounts for a significant amount –
approximately 42.9% in 2009 – of Turkey’s trade, Turkey has significant trade balances
with non-EU countries as well. Turkey’s other largest trading partners are Algeria,
China, Iran, Iraq, Russia, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United States.
2. Trade with the United States
From a U.S. perspective, Turkey is an important friend and a significant trading
partner. In 2010, U.S. exporters exported to Turkey merchandise with an aggregate value
of USD $10,546,388,883, more than ten and a half billion U.S. Dollars. 20 And Turkish
exporters benefited from robust trade as well, exporting to the United States merchandise
with an aggregate value of USD $4,203,675,173.21 Total trade between the United States
and Turkey is voluminous, and it has been trending up on an annual basis.22
Indeed, evidence of Turkey’s importance to the United States is offered by a
legislative bill that was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives in February 2011
to express the sense of the House that the United States ought to initiate negotiations to
enter into a bilateral free trade agreement with Turkey. 23 Naturally, much of the
resolution focuses on Turkey’s importance in international trade.24 It also recognizes
some of the collateral benefits that can flow from robust trade and commerce between
independent nations.25 For example, one assumption stated in the proposed resolution is
that “closer relations with Turkey through free trade agreements would encourage further
privatization in Turkey’s economy.”26
As barriers to trade continue to fall, more and more Turkish entities and U.S.
entities will seek good opportunities for profitable commercial relationships and other
ways to engage in mutually beneficial business transactions.

18

Id. § 1.3.
See id.
20
See 2010 Exports to Turkey of NAICS Total All Merchandise, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ADMINISTRATION, http://tse.export.gov/TSE/TSEHome.aspx (Click on “National Trade Data”; then click
“Product Profiles of U.S. Merchandise Trade with a Selected Market”; under “Trade Partner” select
“Individual Countries” and “Turkey”; under “Product” select “Exports”; then click Go) (last visited Mar.
25, 2011).
21
See 2010 Imports from Turkey of NAICS Total All Merchandise, INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ADMINISTRATION, http://tse.export.gov/TSE/TSEHome.aspx (Click on “National Trade Data”; then click
“Product Profiles of U.S. Merchandise Trade with a Selected Market”; under “Trade Partner” select
“Individual Countries” and “Turkey”; under “Product” select “Imports”; then click Go) (last visited Mar.
25, 2011).
22
See id. This has been true for several years with the sole exception of 2009, when global trade was
generally down due to the global economic crisis. See id.
23
See H.R. RES. 103, 112th Cong. (2011).
24
See id.
25
See id.
26
Id.
19
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3. International Organizations
Sometimes the importance of an economic relationship – and the significance of a
state – is not measured solely by volume of trade or size of the economy. Turkey is an
active participant in the international community. Turkey is a founding member of the
Group of Twenty (G-20)27 and of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD).28 Turkey is also a member of the World Trade Organization and
has been since 1995, its first year of operation. 29 It is clear that Turkey has a high level
of engagement with the major international organizations that influence the world
economy.
Turkey is also a very important bridge between the West and the Muslim world
and to the Caucasian and Central Asian region in particular. A recent poignant example
of Turkey’s important role as intermediary between the West and the Muslim world is
offered by the current conflict in Libya. Among other things, Turkey has played a neutral
role by urging Muammar Qaddafi to step down, on the one hand, while rebuking the
West for certain aspects of its involvement in Libya, on the other hand. 30 The Turkish
embassy in Libya has served as an intermediary for the United States and other Western
states,31 and it has helped obtain the release of four Western journalists, who were held
by Libyan authorities but eventually released into the custody of Turkish diplomats.32 It
is noteworthy that Qaddafi, early in the conflict in Libya, announced a press conference
in connection with the Libyan uprising and the response of his regime, but then refused to
take questions from members of the international media who had been gathered for
nearly eight hours for the press conference, yet nevertheless gave a private interview to
Turkish television. 33
Some of Turkey’s regional leadership arises in the private sector. By way of
example, in 1990 the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey was a
founding member of the Economic Cooperation Organization Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (ECO-CCI), which today boasts ten members, all in the Caucasus and Southwest

27

The G-20, which was established in 1999 as a response to the financial crises of the late 1990s, was
created “to bring together systemically important industrialized and developing economies” for regular
dialogue on key issues related to global economic stability.
What is the G-20,
http://www.g20.org/about_what_is_g20.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
28
See History, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761863_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar. 25,
2011); see also OECD, List of OECD Member countries - Ratification of the Convention on the OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2011).
29
Turkey has been a member of the WTO since March 26, 1995. See Turkey and the WTO, WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/turkey_e.htm (last visited Mar.
10, 2011).
30
See Selcan Hacaoglu, Libyan conflict tests Turkey’s regional role, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 25, 2011.
31
See id.
32
See Jeremy W. Peters, Freed Times Journalists Give Account of Captivity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011.
33
Uri Friedman, Qaddafi Spurns Western Media for Turkish TV, ATLANTIC WIRE, Mar. 9, 2011.
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Asia.34 Specifically, in addition to Turkey, the chambers of commerce and industry (or
the equivalent) in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are all part of the ECO-CCI.35 The purposes of the ECOCCI are to create common policies among its members and to offer guidance to its
members; to increase contacts among its members; and to provide a forum for sharing
information and experience. 36 The organization aims to “[lead] the society in the
region.”37 It offers an example of the leadership role Turkey can play in the region.
Moreover, Turkey itself “offers a location that can serve as a springboard for later
exports to the countries bordering on the Black Sea to the north, the Caucasian republics
and Central Asia to the east, and the oil states of the Middle East to the south.”38
In short, Turkey is in some respects uniquely important to the United States and to
the international community.
II. INTRODUCING THE CISG
A. Turkey’s Accession to the CISG
One contribution that Turkey makes is through its participation in international
legal systems relating to trade and commerce. The latest development in Turkey’s
continuing movement toward harmonization of its laws with international trade law is
Turkey’s accession to the CISG. Turkey acceded to the CISG on July 7, 2010, and the
CISG will therefore enter into force for Turkey on August 1, 2011.39 Turkey’s accession
to the CISG brings to seventy-six the growing number of parties to the CISG, which has
included the United States since 1988.40
The Deputy Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the
United Nations, Fazlı Çorman, stated during a session of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) that took place in New York on July 7, 2010,
that “improvement of the legal framework in which international trade operates is a

34

See Economic Cooperation Organization Chamber of Commerce and Industry, ABOUT ECO-CCI,
ECO-CCI and Its Activities, http://www.ecocci.com/NDC/Generic/Content/About.aspx (last visited
Feb. 19, 2011).
35
Id.
36
See id.
37
Id.
38
Rouleau, supra note 1, at 82.
39
“When a State ratifies, accepts, approves or accedes to this Convention … this Convention … enters into
force in respect of that State … on the first day of the month following the expiration of twelve months
after the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” CISG,
supra note 8, art. 99(2).
40
See United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General,
Chapter X: International Trade and Development, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International
Sale
of
Goods
(Apr.
11,
1980),
Status,
available
at
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20X/X-10.en.pdf [hereinafter CISG
Status].
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fundamental aspect of” the development of international trade “on the basis of equality
and mutual benefit.”41
B. Background on the CISG
The CISG is an international treaty that provides uniform rules for international
sale of goods contracts.42 The CISG was adopted to promote friendly relations among
countries by contributing to the development of international trade on the basis of
equality and mutual benefit. 43
1. The CISG and Europe
The CISG is quite clearly relevant within the European Union. Of the twentyseven EU member states44 and four formal candidates for EU membership, 45 only four
countries are not yet parties to the CISG: Ireland, Malta, Portugal, and the United
Kingdom.46 Thus, a large percentage of the European Union has adopted the CISG. And
it is not only the governments of these EU member states and candidate countries that are
comfortable enough with the CISG to have become parties. Instead, private parties with
their places of business in EU member states, such as Germany, have shown at least some
willingness to be governed by the CISG as well. 47
2. The CISG Outside of Europe
In order to increase the likelihood that the CISG would actually contribute to the
development of international trade (and not just trade among Western nations),
UNCITRAL desired to obtain broader acceptance by countries of different legal, social
and economic systems. One goal of the CISG, after all, is the removal of legal barriers to
international trade.48 Accomplishing that goal in any sort of meaningful way requires
actual participation by countries of different legal, social, and economic systems.
Therefore, UNCITRAL endeavored to involve such countries in the preparation of the
CISG.
41

Fazlı Çorman, Deputy Perm. Rep., Chargé d’affaires a.i., of the Perm. Mission of Turk. to the U.N.,
Statement at the 43rd Session
of
UNCITRAL (July 7,
2010),
available
at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/news/Turkey-CISG-statement.pdf [hereinafter Çorman].
42
See CISG, supra note 8, pmbl.
43
See id.
44
The twenty-seven member states of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom. See Europa, Gateway to the European Union, The member countries of the European
Union, http://europa.eu./about-eu/member-countries/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
45
In addition to Turkey, the three other formal candidates for EU membership are Croatia, the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Iceland. See id.
46
See CISG Status, supra note 40.
47
See Spagnolo, supra note 54, at 138 n.8.
48
See id.; see also id., explanatory note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the UN Convention on Contracts
for the Int’l Sale of Goods, ¶ 3 [hereinafter CISG Explanatory Note]. The CISG Explanatory Note was
prepared by the UNCITRAL Secretariat for informational purposes and is not an official commentary to the
CISG. See id.
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Indeed, the CISG is hardly a European or even a Western phenomenon. In fact,
one of the purposes of the CISG was to replace two predecessor international sales law
treaties that were criticized for “reflecting primarily the legal traditions and economic
realities of continental Western Europe,” the region that predominantly prepared the
predecessor conventions. 49 In preparing the CISG and achieving its adoption,
UNCITRAL seems to have achieved greater success in wider acceptance, demonstrated
by the fact that the original eleven parties to the CISG “included States from every
geographical region, every stage of economic development and every major legal, social
and economic system.”50 And the CISG was notably drafted in six official languages,
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish, each of which is equally
authentic. 51 As an example of the importance this has for Turkey, among Turkey’s top
trading partners outside of the European Union, China, Russia, and Iraq are all already
parties to the CISG.52
C. A Work in Progress
While its purposes are laudable, the CISG is a work in progress. It was finalized
and first signed in 1980 after years of preparatory work by UNCITRAL, but it did not
enter into force until 1988. 53 Moreover, in some jurisdictions, notably including the
United States, the CISG has been slow to emerge as a viable alternative body of sales
law.54 This seems to be due more to unfamiliarity with and unfounded suspicion of the
CISG than to meaningful analysis of the substantive allocation of risk and responsibility
established by the CISG.55
This is not the case everywhere, however, as buyers and sellers in some
jurisdictions have become quite accustomed to the CISG.56 And it is beginning to change
in the United States as well, as the U.S. bench and bar become more familiar with the
CISG, and as the body of U.S. case law interpreting or analyzing the CISG grows.57 And
49

CISG Explanatory Note, supra note 48, ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 4. The original eleven parties were Argentina, China, Egypt, France, Hungary, Italy, Lesotho,
Syria, the United States, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. See id.
51
See CISG, supra note 8, signature block.
52
See CISG Status, supra note 40.
53
See id. The CISG provides for its entry into force “on the first day of the month following the expiration
of twelve months after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession ….” CISG, supra note 8, art 99(1).
54
There is a strong tendency by U.S. lawyers to counsel their clients to exclude application of the CISG.
See Lisa Spagnolo, A Glimpse through the Kaleidoscope: Choices of Law and the CISG, 13 VINDOBONA J.
INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 135, 135 & n.2 (2009).
55
See id. at 137-40.
56
See id. at 137-38, n.8, n.9 & n.10.
57
For years after the CISG entered into force, U.S. courts routinely took note of the relative paucity of
decisions by U.S. courts interpreting or applying the CISG. See, e.g., Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing
Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009)
(acknowledging that the case law interpreting and applying the CISG is sparse); Forestal Guarani, S.A. v.
Daros Int’l, Inc., Civil Action No. 03-4821 (JAG), 2008 WL 4560701, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008), rev’d on
other grounds, 613 F.3d 395, 396 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Although the CISG has been in force for nearly two
decades, there still are few U.S. decisions interpreting the Convention.”). This is beginning to change,
however. In 2009 there were thirteen opinions reported by U.S. courts that recognized the application or
potential application of the CISG and/or that analyzed the CISG in some way, though most contained little
50
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as more and more countries accede to the CISG and more and more transactions are
automatically governed by the CISG, its relevance around the world increases.
D. Moving toward Reducing Uncertainty
So how is the CISG to accomplish the goal of improving the legal framework in
which international trade operates? Imagine the following hypothetical situation:
A Turkish buyer negotiates with a U.S. supplier for the purchase of certain
capital equipment, which the Turkish buyer will use in its production
facility in Istanbul. Following a successful conclusion to the negotiation,
the parties enter into a written Capital Equipment Supply Agreement,
which identifies the purchase price, method and timing of payments,
timeline for performance, provisions for delay liquidated damages, design
specifications, warranty terms (including an express disclaimer of implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for any particular purpose),
procedures and standards for acceptance testing, and some other general
commercial terms, but the written agreement does not include a choice-oflaw clause.
The U.S. supplier has an Italian affiliate, and the U.S. supplier
subcontracts with its Italian affiliate for the fabrication and delivery of the
capital equipment. After fabrication and delivery are complete, the U.S.
supplier sends a technical team to erect and start up the capital equipment
and to satisfy the agreed-upon acceptance test at the buyer’s site in
Istanbul. The equipment satisfies the acceptance test, and final payment is
made.
While operating the equipment in subsequent weeks, something goes
wrong with the equipment, necessitating a shutdown of the equipment and
the facility. The Turkish buyer incurs significant costs related to the
shutdown, including costs of inspection, repair costs, lost profits, lost
customers, and labor costs associated with the shutdown. The Turkish
buyer believes that a latent defect in the equipment caused the shutdown
and decides to bring a claim against the U.S. supplier.
If the buyer in the hypothetical situation brings a claim (whether in Turkey, in the
United States, or somewhere else), one of the threshold questions for the court will be,
what law governs the contract and the contract dispute? Is it Turkish law, the law of a
U.S. state, Italian law, or some other body of law? A court will use its principles
pertaining to private international law (or conflicts of laws, as it is known in the United
States) to determine which body of law applies. How a court would answer the question
(that is, the principles that it will use) will be very different from one jurisdiction to the
analysis. See William P. Johnson, U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, in
International Commercial Transactions, Franchising, and Distribution, 44 INT’L LAW. 238, 239-40 (2010).
And in 2010 there were sixteen opinions reported by U.S. courts that contained some analysis or
interpretation of the CISG, so the body of U.S. case law is growing.
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next. In fact, there are differences among various U.S. states, which can lead to
application by different courts of different bodies of law under the same facts and the
same set of circumstances.
That threshold determination of applicable law can in turn affect how other
important questions are answered: What warranties (statutory, express, or implied) can
be shown to have been made? Will the warranty disclaimer effectively exclude implied
warranties? Are there statutory warranties that cannot be waived, which might have been
breached? How is the seller’s performance measured? Does the Turkish buyer have to
establish ‘fundamental breach’ in order to recover damages? What kinds of damages can
the buyer claim, if a breach is ultimately shown? For example, are lost profits or other
consequential damages recoverable? Will the prevailing party be able to recover
attorneys’ fees?
How a court would answer these and similar questions will be very different
under different bodies of law, and a considerable amount of time, energy, and resources
could be spent trying to navigate all of the potentially applicable bodies of law. This
uncertainty increases the cost of doing business. And this uncertainty contributed to the
United States’ decision to ratify the CISG:
International trade now is subject to serious legal uncertainties. Questions
often arise as to whether our law or foreign law governs the transaction,
and our traders and their counsel find it difficult to evaluate and answer
claims based on one or another of the many unfamiliar foreign legal
systems. The Convention’s uniform rules offer effective answers to these
problems. 58
Now that Turkey is a party to the CISG, the uncertainty and the associated dispute
resolution costs are readily reduced or eliminated, as the contract and the contract dispute
described in the hypothetical situation would be governed not by domestic sales law, but
by the CISG, no matter which court – U.S., Turkish, or Italian – hears the claim.
As the CISG becomes increasingly relevant in the United States and as trade with
Turkey continues to rise, Turkey’s accession to the CISG therefore creates an important
common legal framework for sales transactions between Turkish and U.S. contracting
parties, and it has immediate importance for international sale of goods transactions
involving counterparties located in numerous jurisdictions that have particular
significance for Turkey.
Additionally, it is conceivable that Turkey will pave the way for further expansion
of the CISG in the region. Of the nine other countries whose chambers of commerce and
industry are members of the ECO-CCI, discussed in Part x, supra, so far only two are
parties to the CISG: Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. 59 Given the purposes of the ECO-CCI
and the role Turkey plays in the region, it seems likely that Turkey’s accession to the
58

Letter of Transmittal from President Reagan to the Senate of the U.S. (Sept. 21, 1983), in S. Treaty Doc.
No. 98-9, at iii (1983) [hereinafter Letter of Transmittal].
59
See CISG Status, supra note 40.

© 2011 William P. Johnson

10

WPJ DRAFT – 8/18/2011

CISG will help to pave the way for other Caucasian and Central Asian republics – among
others – to follow suit. In fact, Çorman has called on non-signatories to do just that:
Having 74 state parties from every geographical region, every stage of
economic development and every major legal, social and economic system
clearly demonstrates the objectivism and comprehensive nature of the
Convention.
Today Turkey, by submitting the instrument of accession, joins the State
Parties of the Convention.
We would like to call other states that are not party yet to consider
becoming parties to the Convention.60
III. MAKING THE CISG MEANINGFUL
Of course, accession to the CISG is the first step only. There are three additional
steps to be taken before the CISG can have the positive effect it is designed to have –
steps that are, frankly, still in early stages in the United States as well. First, practitioners
in Turkey must familiarize themselves with the CISG in order to provide their clients
with sound advice regarding whether the CISG or some other body of sales law is the
best choice of law to govern any particular agreement. Such advice should not take the
form of automatic application or exclusion of the CISG. Rather, to give meaningful
advice requires deep understanding of the choices available to the parties, including the
CISG, and careful consideration of the circumstances of the transaction that support
selection of one body of law over another. Because the CISG automatically applies to
certain sale of goods contracts unless the CISG has been excluded by the parties to the
contract, such advice must include advice regarding whether to exclude application of the
CISG.61
Second, Turkish courts and other decision-makers must develop the familiarity
with the CISG that is necessary to interpret and apply the CISG in good faith, which they
are required under international law to do.62 International law further requires that a
treaty’s interpretation be governed by analysis of its text and its context, in light of its
object and purpose.63 And the CISG itself specifically requires courts to interpret the
CISG with due regard to the international character of the CISG, to the need to apply the
CISG uniformly, and “to the need to promote … the observance of good faith in
60

Çorman, supra note 41 (emphasis added).
See CISG, supra note 8, arts. 1(1) and 6.
62
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. While Turkey is not a party to the Vienna Convention, the Vienna
Convention is widely recognized as codification of customary international law, that is, of the customary
law of treaties. To the extent the Vienna Convention is a codification of customary international law, it is
binding as a matter of international law even on those states that are not parties to the Vienna Convention.
See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993, 3 Bevans 1179.
63
See id.
61

© 2011 William P. Johnson

11

WPJ DRAFT – 8/18/2011

international trade.”64 While U.S. courts continue to find their way, sometimes
interpreting the CISG soundly and sometimes not, Turkish courts have a clean slate and
an opportunity to establish right away a reputation and tradition of faithful and careful
interpretation and application of the CISG, which will greatly enhance predictability and
certainty for Turkish parties to international sales contracts.
And third, Turkish law schools must integrate into their curriculum meaningful
coverage of the CISG so that the future members of the Turkish bench and bar have
received the training and education that will facilitate steps one and two.65 After all, “the
less exposure a lawyer has had to the CISG at law school, the more inclined the lawyer
will be toward exclusion in practice.”66 Similarly, the more exposure – through
meaningful training and education – a lawyer has had to the CISG while in law school,
the more able the lawyer will be to understand the CISG and to provide her client with
effective advice regarding its application, its interpretation, its advantages, and its
disadvantages.
A. Automatic Application of the CISG
One key aspect of proper understanding of the CISG is to know when it applies
and when it does not. Under Article 1(1)(a) the CISG automatically applies to contracts
for the sale of goods that are made between parties whose respective places of business
are in different countries when the countries are “Contracting States” (that is, parties to
the CISG).67 Under Article 1(1)(b) the CISG also applies to contracts for the sale of
goods between parties whose places of business are in different countries even when one
or more of the parties has its place of business in a country that is not a Contracting State,
if the “rules of private international law [would] lead to the application of the law of a
Contracting State.”68 The United States declared when it ratified the CISG that the
United States would not be bound by Article 1(1)(b),69 a declaration for which the CISG
specifically provides.70 Article 1(1)(b) is therefore inapplicable in the United States.
However, Turkey made no such declaration, and Turkish courts should therefore apply
the CISG not only when the parties to the contract for the sale of goods have their
respective places of business in different countries that are parties to the CISG, but also
when Turkey’s principles pertaining to private international law would lead to application
of the substantive law of any party to the CISG, including Turkey.

64

See CISG, supra note 8, art. 7(1) (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good
faith in international trade.”).
65
See Spagnolo, supra note 54, at 141-42.
66
Id. at 142.
67
CISG, supra note 8, art. 1(1)(a). The term “Contracting States” refers to countries that have signed the
CISG and have also ratified, accepted, or approved the CISG, and it refers to non-signatory countries that
have acceded to the CISG. See CISG, supra note 8, art. 91. Therefore, “Contracting States” is the term
used in the CISG to refer to its parties.
68
Id. art. 1(1)(b).
69
See CISG Status, supra note 40, at 4.
70
See CISG, supra note 8, art. 95.
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B. Contracts outside the Scope of the CISG
The CISG does not apply to all international sales, however. In fact, there are
numerous sales that are expressly excluded from the scope of application of the CISG.71
Perhaps the most notable exclusion is that the CISG does not apply to sales “of goods
bought for personal, family or household use,” unless the seller did not know and had no
reason to know at the time the contract was made that the goods sold were intended for
any such use. 72 The CISG also does not apply to mixed sales of goods and services when
“the preponderant part of the obligations” of the seller consists in the supply of labor or
other services.73 Similarly, the CISG does not apply to toll manufacturing or similar
arrangements when the buyer supplies the seller with “a substantial part of the materials
necessary” for the manufacture or production of the goods.74
In the typical cross-border sales transaction involving non-consumer goods,
however, when each party knows the other party is located in a different country, the
CISG will usually govern the transaction, if the parties’ places of business that are most
directly involved with the transaction are in countries that are parties to the CISG.75
Because there are currently seventy-six parties to the CISG,76 including most of Turkey’s
major trading partners, the CISG is potentially relevant for a very large volume of
international trade involving Turkish buyers and sellers.
C. The Effect of Choosing Turkish Law
One source of confusion regarding exclusion of the CISG is the role that a choiceof-law clause should play in a court’s analysis concerning the parties’ intent to exclude
application of the CISG. In the United States, some courts have incorrectly reasoned or
concluded that a choice-of-law clause that chooses the jurisdiction whose laws are to
govern the contract but that is silent on the application of the CISG effectively excludes
the CISG.77 However, when the parties include a choice-of-law clause in their
agreement, if the jurisdiction whose law is selected by the choice-of-law clause is a state
within the United States or is a country that is a party to the CISG, including Turkey, then
such a choice-of-law clause generally should not have the effect of excluding the CISG
71

See id. arts. 2 and 3.
Id. art. 2(a). Other international sales are specifically excluded from the CISG’s scope because if the
nature of the sale (that is, sales by auction and sales on execution or otherwise by authority of law). See id.
arts. 2(b) and 2(c). And still others are excluded due to the nature of the goods being sold (namely, stocks,
shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments, and money; ships, vessels, hovercraft, and aircraft;
and electricity). See id. arts. 2(d)-2(f).
73
Id. art. 3(2).
74
Id. art. 3(1).
75
See id. art. 1(1)(a).
76
See CISG Status, supra note 40.
77
See, e.g., Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D.R.I. 2006)
(concluding that a choice-of-law clause choosing the laws of the state of Rhode Island – but silent on the
CISG – was sufficient to exclude application of the CISG). For criticism of the American Biophysics
decision, see Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d
1075, 1081-82 (D. Minn. 2007); see also William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the CISG: A
New Paradigm of Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 230-32 (2011).
72
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when the CISG is otherwise applicable. This is so because the CISG is the law of the
selected jurisdiction. 78
The travaux préparatoires of the CISG support the notion that the CISG becomes
part of the national laws of a country upon that country’s ratification of (or accession to)
the CISG.79 For example, according to Mr. Plantard of France, “when a State had the
Convention ratified by its Parliament, it decided by the same action to incorporate the
rules into its legal system.”80 Similarly, Mr. Shafik of Egypt said that “the provisions of
the Convention were incorporated in the national law of a contracting State.”81
Fortunately, a large number of U.S. courts have recognized that a choice-of-law
clause selecting the law of a country that is a party to the CISG, or selecting the law of a
U.S. state, has the effect of selecting the CISG as well. 82 One federal appellate court, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, concluded in BP Oil International, Ltd. v.
Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador that a choice-of-law clause selecting the laws of
Ecuador merely confirmed that the CISG governed the transaction because the CISG is
part of the law of Ecuador.83 A significant number of other U.S. courts have taken that
position. Recently, in Remy, Inc. v. Tecnomatic S.p.A., a federal court in Indiana
considered a choice-of-law clause selecting the laws of the State of Indiana in a

78

For jurisdictions within the United States, this is so as a matter of U.S. constitutional law. See U.S.
CONST. art. VI. For a more detailed analysis of the effect of a choice-of-law clause on application of the
CISG under U.S. constitutional law, see Johnson, supra note 77, at 223-28.
79
The travaux préparatoires, or drafting history, of a treaty is relevant for a court’s interpretation of the
treaty. See Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 32.
80
Summary Records of the First Committee, 4th Meeting, ¶ 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.4 (Mar. 13,
1980), reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Official
Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, at 251 (1991).
81
Id. ¶ 35.
82
See, e.g., Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d
1075, 1081-82 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding that mere reference to a specific state’s law does not constitute
an exclusion of the CISG); Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-650, 2006 WL 42090,
at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2006) (concluding that a choice-of-law clause choosing the laws of the State of
Georgia but silent as to the application of the CISG would not have the effect of excluding the CISG);
Valero Mktg. & Supply Co. v. Greeni Oy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 475, 482 (D.N.J. 2005) (concluding that
inclusion in an oral agreement of a provision that New York law applied to the agreement did not exclude
application of the CISG and that, under New York law, courts would apply the CISG by virtue of the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution), rev’d on other grounds, 242 F. App’x 840, 845 (3d Cir. 2007);
Ajax Tool Works, Inc. v. Can-Eng Mfg. Ltd., No. 01 C 5938, 2003 WL 223187, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30,
2003) (concluding that a choice-of-law clause choosing the laws of Ontario, Canada does not exclude the
CISG); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS),
2002 WL 465312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (recognizing that the CISG is an integral part of German
law, and that when parties designate a choice-of-law clause in their contract selecting the law of a country
that is a party to the CISG without excluding the CISG, the CISG is the law of the designated country);
Asante Technologies, Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (concluding
that a choice-of law clause choosing the law of British Columbia, Canada, chooses the CISG when it is
applicable because the CISG is the law of British Columbia, and further concluding that a choice-of-law
clause choosing the laws of California also would not exclude the CISG).
83
BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2003), as
amended on denial of reh’g.
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transaction between an Italian seller and a U.S. buyer.84 The court in Remy, Inc. reasoned
that a choice-of-law provision “that specifies only that a signatory state’s law applies is
insufficient [to opt out of the CISG] because the CISG is the law of that state.”85 Another
U.S. federal court recently reasoned that “‘[a] signatory’s assent to the CISG necessarily
incorporates the treaty as part of that nation’s domestic law.’”86
For Turkish courts considering application of the CISG, the CISG should apply
unless the parties have excluded it, and a simple choice-of-law clause choosing the laws
of Turkey or the laws of any jurisdiction within the United States – or even a neutral
country that is a party to the CISG, such as Germany, for that matter – to govern the
agreement should not by itself have the effect of excluding application of the CISG. On
the contrary, such a choice-of-law clause would constitute strong evidence of the parties’
intent for their contract to be governed by the CISG.
Except with respect to issues of contract formation, this is the case for any and all
contracts entered into on or after August 1, 2011.87 This is not automatically the case,
however, for any contracts entered into prior to that date. For any such contracts, Turkish
courts should apply their traditional private international law principles to determine the
applicable body of law. However, if application of principles pertaining to private
international law leads to the application of the substantive law of a Contracting State
with respect to which the CISG had entered into force at or prior to the time the parties
entered into their contract, then pursuant to Article 1(1)(b) the CISG would still govern
the contract unless the CISG has been excluded.88
D. Effectively Excluding the CISG
It is not enough for Turkish or U.S. courts to understand the CISG’s sphere of
application and, therefore, when the CISG would apply by its terms to a contract,
however. Rather, courts must also consider whether the parties intended to exclude the
84

See Remy, Inc. v. Tecnomatic S.p.A., No. 1:08-cv-1227-SEB-WGH, 2010 WL 4174594, at *1 (S.D. Ind.
Oct. 18, 2010).
85
Id. (emphasis in original).
86
Semi-Materials Co., Ltd. v. MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc., No. 4:06CV1426 FRB, 2011 WL 134062, at *1
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 10, 2011). The court consequently granted a motion to exclude testimony of an expert that
was sought under a federal rule of civil procedure permitting expert testimony to determine foreign law.
See id.
87
See CISG, supra note 8, art. 100(2). The issue of applicability of the CISG is slightly more complicated
when the court is dealing with an issue of formation, as opposed an issue of contract interpretation or
enforcement, because Article 100 of the CISG makes a distinction between formation issues, on the one
hand, and other issues. Under Article 100(1) provides that the CISG “applies to the formation of a contract
only when the proposal for concluding the contract is made on or after the date when the [CISG] enters into
force in respect of the Contracting States referred to in [Article 1(1)(a)] or the Contracting State referred to
in [Article 1(1)(b)].” CISG, supra note 8, art. 100(1). With respect to issues of formation, therefore, the
CISG applies only if the date of the proposal for concluding the contract follows the relevant date of entry
into force. See id. And the date of the “proposal” for concluding the contract refers to the offer in the
contract formation process. See id. art. 14(1); see also Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration
and Contract Formation in International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L.
& Com. 239, 249-50 (1993).
88
See id.
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CISG, because the CISG expressly provides for election not to be bound by the CISG:
“The parties may exclude the application of this Convention ….”89
Naturally, the right to exclude application of the CISG begs the question of how
the parties are to exclude it. It might be tempting to assume that the only way to exclude
application of the CISG is by doing so expressly and, at least when there is a written
contract, in writing. Indeed, Turkish practitioners and their clients should be aware that
many U.S. courts have suggested that that is the case.90 By way of example, earlier this
year a federal court in New York reasoned that “intent to opt out of the CISG must be set
forth in the contract clearly and unequivocally” in order to exclude the CISG when it
otherwise applies. 91
In fact, including an express choice-of-law clause accompanied by an explicit
exclusion of the CISG that is clear, conspicuous, and in a writing signed by the parties is
arguably the most desirable means of excluding the CISG. And if the parties wish their
contract to be governed by the CISG, then it is sensible to include in their written contract
an express choice-of-law clause opting for application of the CISG. Additionally, even
when the CISG is selected by the parties, the choice-of-law clause choosing the CISG
should also clearly choose a domestic body of law as a supplemental body of law,
because the CISG itself will not answer every question or resolve every dilemma that the
parties might encounter. 92 In fact, if a question must be answered in order to resolve a
dispute and the CISG does not provide the answer, courts are obligated under Article 7(2)
to settle such questions “in conformity with the general principles on which [the CISG] is
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law.”93 Therefore, selecting the body of the
law that the court is to use in order to settle such questions is also desirable, establishing
at the beginning of the relationship the body of law that will govern the contract and its
interpretation in the event that a dispute arises after the parties are no longer interested in
cooperating with each other. But it is important to note that the CISG does not require
89

Id. art. 6.
See, e.g., Forestal Guarani, S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc., Civ. Action No. 03-4821 (JAG), 2008 WL 4560701,
at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 8, 2008) (“The inclusion of an alternate choice of law provision must . . . be announced
explicitly in the contract.”); Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, LLC, Civil Action No. 07-161JBT, 2008 WL 754734, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008) (“Although the parties to a contract normally
controlled by the CISG may exclude the applicability of the CISG to their contract, any such exclusion
must be explicit.”); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Saint-Gobain Technical Fabrics Can. Ltd., 474 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, 1082 (D. Minn. 2007) (concluding that a choice-of-law clause does not exclude the CISG
“absent an express statement that the CISG does not apply”); St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Neuromed Med.
Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002)
(reasoning that German law, and therefore the CISG, was the applicable body of law: “(1) both the U.S.
and Germany are Contracting States to [the CISG], and (2) neither party chose, by express provision in the
contract, to opt out of the application of the CISG”).
91
Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochems., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10559(AKH), 2011 WL 165404, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 18, 2011).
92
Like any single body of law, the CISG is limited in its scope, not addressing every contingency or issue
that could appear. Indeed, certain items are specifically excluded from its scope, including the effect that
the sale of goods contract might have on the property interest in the goods sold, see CISG, supra note 8, art.
4(b), and liability for death or personal injury. See id. art 5.
93
Id. art 7(2).
90
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written exclusion of the CISG, nor does it require exclusion to be express. In fact, Article
6 establishes no particular means of exclusion of the CISG.94 And Article 11 of the CISG
specifically rejects any writing requirement, allowing a contract to be proved “by any
means, including witnesses.”95
Still, many courts are likely to conclude that exclusion of the CISG must be
explicit in order to be effective. While uncertainty can never be absolutely eliminated, it
is good practice to include in the written contract an express clause that makes the
parties’ mutual intent clear regarding the CISG, whether their intent is to exclude the
CISG or for the CISG to apply, and regarding the domestic law that will govern the
agreement, whether in lieu of or as a supplement to the CISG.96
IV. CHOOSING THE CISG
The analysis regarding choice of law in which a Turkish practitioner should
engage is complex. Among other things, the Turkish practitioner must consider whether
the relevant contract clauses relating to choice of law are likely to be enforceable in
jurisdictions where claims are likely to be filed. In sales transactions with U.S.
contracting parties, the Turkish practitioner must in particular consider whether the
clauses would be enforced by a U.S. court, because the Turkish contracting party might
need to seek the assistance of a U.S court to enforce a contractual agreement – or to
recognize and enforce a foreign judgment or arbitral award – if the U.S. contracting
party’s assets are located only within the territory of the United States.
A. Anticipating the Dispute when Times are Good
For some business relationships it might be difficult to persuade the client of the
value of taking the time and incurring the expense that may be necessary to reach
agreement on certain dispute resolution terms. After all, when Turkish, U.S., and other
companies enter into business relationships, the contracting parties often are optimistic
about the future of that relationship. Generally, each party expects the business
relationship to be beneficial, or the parties would not freely enter into the contract. In the
ordinary case, the relationship proceeds without significant dispute, and applicable law
never really matters to the parties.
But sometimes contingencies – both foreseeable and unforeseeable – materialize
that cause at least one of the parties to no longer wish to perform; to regret the bargain
struck; or to suffer significant losses. And sometimes, whether due to cultural
differences, language barriers, or haste in the consummation of the transaction,
misunderstandings regarding the agreed-upon allocation of risk and responsibility can
occur. Such contingencies and misunderstandings can cause the relationship to
deteriorate in such a way that the parties no longer expect good things to happen. When
94

See id. art. 6.
“A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other
requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.” CISG, supra note 8, art. 11.
96
For additional analysis by the author of effective exclusion of the CISG, see generally Johnson, supra
note 77.
95
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those kinds of situations arise, disputes often follow, and applicable law can matter a
great deal.
Of course, contractual disputes, whether domestic or international, are never
desirable. Disputes cause delay, disputes can ruin fruitful business relationships, and
resolution of disputes is time-consuming and expensive. But international disputes can
be especially difficult and costly. In addition to all of the hardship associated with an
ordinary domestic dispute, now the parties to the dispute must contend with international
discovery, cross-border service of process, foreign legal proceedings, potentially
applicable bodies of foreign law and international law, language barriers, cultural
differences, and the logistical difficulties of dealing with a dispute that may be taking
place in some far corner of the planet.
For these reasons and others, the simple truth is that no amount of planning for
dispute resolution can ever assure that a dispute that arises in an international business
transaction will be easy or inexpensive to navigate, manage, or resolve. But there are
some important items that should be considered and addressed by the parties to any
international transaction, and those items should be addressed before the parties enter into
any contract, understanding, or arrangement, oral or written, and before they begin to
conduct business with each other, or it could be too late to reach agreement once the
parties are no longer interested in cooperating with each other.
As the preceding section of this article suggests, one of the items that can and
should be addressed in this regard in every international contract is choice of law. 97
B. Choice of Law
In many jurisdictions the parties have at least some freedom to choose for
themselves the body of law that will govern their contract. Under Turkish law,
international contracting parties are generally free to choose the law that will govern their
contract.98 This is so in the United States as well. 99 Thus, when a Turkish buyer or seller
enters into a sale of goods transaction with a U.S. counterparty, the parties might
conceivably choose Turkish law, the law of a U.S. state, or the law of a neutral
jurisdiction (and, of course, they should also expressly choose to exclude or to be
governed by the CISG). However, there are some limits under U.S. law relating to which
body of law U.S. contracting parties are able to choose to govern their contract.
97

For a description and analysis by the author of some of the dispute resolution issues that should be
considered by non-U.S. parties who enter into international business contracts with U.S. parties or that are
governed by U.S. law, see William P. Johnson, Controvérsia no horizonte: Contratação para Resolução
Eficaz de Disputas em Transações Comerciais Internacionais. Uma perspectiva norte-americana. [The
Dispute on the Horizon: Contracting for Effective Dispute Resolution in International Business
Transactions. A U.S. Perspective.], 86 REVISTA DE DIREITO DO TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA DO ESTADO DO RIO
DE JANEIRO 40 (Alexandre Freitas Câmara & Antonio Carlos Esteves Torres trans., 2011) (Braz.).
98
See Prof. Dr. Gülin Güngör, The Principle of Proximity in Contractual Obligations: The New Turkish
Law on Private International Law and International Civil Procedure, 5 ANKARA L. REV. 1, 6 (2008) (citing
Articles 24/1 and 24/2 of Milletlerarası Özel Hukuk ve Usul Hukuku Hakkında Kanun [Law on Private
International Law and International Civil Procedure] (MÖHUK)).
99
See U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (2011).
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C. Limits in the United States on Choice of Law
Notwithstanding the freedom of contract generally enjoyed within the United
States, discussed in Part x, infra, U.S. parties are not free simply to select the law of
whatever jurisdiction they wish to select to govern the contract, at least not in purely
domestic transactions. This is due to the fact that in the United States there are limits,
established on a state-by-state basis, on the parties’ freedom to choose the jurisdiction
whose laws will govern their transaction. In general there must be some relationship
between the transaction and the jurisdiction selected, or some courts in the United States
are unlikely to enforce the parties’ choice of law.100
1. Uniform Commercial Code – U.S. Domestic Sales Law
In the United States there is a uniform law known as the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC),101 discussed in greater detail in Part x, infra. Under the UCC, the parties
are free to choose the state or country whose laws will govern their transaction, as long as
the transaction bears a reasonable relation to the state or country selected: “Except as
otherwise provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this
state and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this
state or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties.”102 The official
comments to Section 1-301 of the UCC confirm that the parties to a multi-state
transaction or a transaction involving foreign trade have the right to choose their own
law, but that the right to choose their own law “is limited to jurisdictions to which the
transaction bears a ‘reasonable relation.’”103
The official comments continue:
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See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 671.105(1) (2009).
Except as provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and
also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such
other state or nation will govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement, this code applies
to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
Id. (emphasis added).
101
The UCC has been widely adopted into the law of the states of the United States. Article 2 of the UCC
generally applies to all transactions in goods. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2011). Because Article 2 of the UCC
defines “goods” quite broadly and without significant carve-outs, the scope of UCC Article 2 is very broad:
“Goods” means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action. “Goods” also includes the unborn young of
animals and growing crops and other identified things attached to realty as described in the section
on goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107).
Id. § 2-105(1). Article 2 of the UCC has been adopted by every state throughout the United States, other
than by the State of Louisiana, making Article 2 of the UCC the primary domestic sales law in the United
States.
See Uniform Commercial Code Locator, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL—LEGAL
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). See
also Acts, UCC Articles 2 and 2A (2003), UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=UCC Articles 2 and 2A
(2003) (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
102
U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (2011).
103
Id. § 1-301 official cmt. 1.
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“Ordinarily the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough
portion of the making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs.”104
2. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws – U.S. Common Law
When the UCC is not applicable, there are several different approaches under the
common law in the United States that are taken by different states for determining
whether the parties’ choice of law is enforceable, but more states (though not a majority)
follow some version of the approach set forth in the Second Restatement of Conflict of
105
Laws than any other approach.
Under that approach, courts may refuse to enforce a
choice-of-law clause under two circumstances: first, when there is no reasonable basis
for the parties’ choice, and second when application of the chosen law would violate a
fundamental public policy of another jurisdiction with a materially greater interest in the
dispute.106 And when the parties and the transaction have no relationship with the
jurisdiction selected, many U.S. courts will conclude that there is no reasonable basis for
the parties’ selection, making the selection unenforceable.
But when there is any reasonable basis for the selection, U.S. courts will generally
respect the parties’ choice. A choice-of-law clause choosing the laws of Turkey would
almost certainly be enforced, especially when the buyer or seller has its place of business
in Turkey or performance is to occur there. Similarly, applying traditional choice-of-law
rules, U.S. courts would enforce with little or no hesitation the parties’ selection of the
law of any U.S. state where the U.S. counterparty has a place of business or where
performance occurs or is to occur.

104

Id.
Restatements of the Law, including the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, are produced by the
American Law Institute, an independent organization in the United States made up of lawyers, judges, and
law professors.
See The American Law Institute, About ALI, ALI Overview,
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=about.overview. The Restatements are produced in an effort to
explain what the common law is, but the Restatements are not themselves binding law. They nevertheless
can have considerable influence on the decisions of U.S. courts.
106
The Second Restatement provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision
in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights and duties will be
applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties could not have resolved by an explicit
provision in their agreement directed to that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties’ choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy
of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the determination
of the particular issue and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187 (1971).
105

© 2011 William P. Johnson

20

WPJ DRAFT – 8/18/2011

3. International Transactions
Moreover, in international contexts, U.S. courts have shown willingness to respect
the parties’ choices regarding forum and law, even when there is no apparent nexus with
the selected jurisdiction, suggesting that U.S. courts will allow greater freedom to choose
the laws of a neutral jurisdiction when the transaction is international. 107 In the seminal
case on forum selection, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the trial court gave too little weight and effect to a forum selection clause that
appeared to designate the High Court of Justice in London as the exclusive forum for
dispute resolution.108 And the Court concluded that the forum clause should control
absent a strong showing setting it aside, a conclusion reached even though there was no
apparent nexus with the jurisdiction selected.109 The court reasoned that “expansion of
American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts.”110
While M/S Bremen is a case primarily concerned with recognition and
enforcement of a forum selection clause, the Court conducted its analysis under the
apparent presumption that the English court would apply English law:
[W]hile the contract here did not specifically provide that the substantive
law of England should be applied, it is the general rule in English courts
that the parties are assumed, absent contrary indication, to have designated
the forum with the view that it should apply its own law. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that the forum clause was also an effort to obtain
certainty as to the applicable substantive law.111
The Court’s reasoning therefore ought to apply with equal force to enforcement of
choice of law. And though the case was concerned with federal admiralty law (and not
state contract law), state courts have nevertheless adopted the reasoning of M/S

107

See, e.g., M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S. Ct. 1907, 1916 (1972); see also
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629, 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355 (1985)
(recognizing broad discretion to select the method and forum of dispute resolution in the international
context); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516, 94 S. Ct. 2449, 2455-56 (1974), rehearing
denied (enforcing a forum selection clause that had been agreed upon by an Austrian company and a Us.
Company, which provided for arbitration in Paris, France, and reasoning that, in the absence of a forum
selection clause, considerable uncertainty “will almost inevitably exist with respect to any contract
touching two or more countries, each with its own substantive laws and conflict-of-laws rules”); Filanto,
S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (enforcing an agreement to
arbitrate in Russia that was entered into between Italian and U.S. counterparties).
108
407 U.S. at 8, 92 S. Ct. at 1912.
109
See id. at 15, 92 S. Ct. at 1916.
110
Id. at 9, 92 S. Ct. at 1912.
111
Id. at 13 n.15, 92 S. Ct. at 1915 n.15 (citations omitted); see also id. at 9, 92 S. Ct. at 1913 (“We cannot
have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by
our laws, and resolved in our courts.”); see also id. at 8 n.8, 92 S. Ct. at 1912 n.8 (noting that “the
limitation fund in England would be only slightly in excess of $80,000 under English law”) (emphasis
added).
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Bremen.112 An express choice-of-law clause selecting the laws of a neutral third country
is therefore likely to be enforced by U.S. courts in the context of an international
commercial transaction, even in the absence of any relationship with the selected
jurisdiction.
D. Choosing U.S. Law
When the parties agree to select U.S. law, however, the parties must select the
particular U.S. state whose laws will govern the contract, for contract law is largely state
– not federal – law in the United States. The U.S. counterparty might initially negotiate
for application of the law of its home state, due to familiarity and comfort with the law of
the home state. But it is very common for parties to international business transactions
that are to be governed by U.S. law to choose New York as the state whose law will
govern the transaction. And this is so whether or not the transaction has any relationship
with the State of New York. While the reasons for choosing New York law to govern a
transaction may be varied and complex, there are three reasons either that contribute to
the practice of choosing New York law to govern international business transactions or
that make the choice a sensible choice (or both).
1. Why New York?
First, when U.S. lenders are involved in financing a transaction or a project, the
lenders will often insist on New York law as the law that is to govern the contract
documents.113 And this applies not only to those contract documents that relate directly
to the contractual relationship between the lender and the borrower, but also to contract
documents entered into by the borrower with third parties who will perform for the
borrower. U.S. lenders do this for a variety of reasons, including consistency and
predictability. But one significant reason is to be confident that the security interest that
the lenders take as protection against the risk of payment default will be recognized and
enforceable – against all interested parties – under applicable law. By consistently
selecting New York law and following the rituals prescribed by New York law, the U.S.
lenders reduce the risk of a security interest not being recognized or enforced.
Second, even when U.S. lenders are not involved in the transaction, New York
law is still often selected. It seems that New York is a jurisdiction with which non-U.S.
parties to international transactions tend to be more comfortable. This could be due to
general familiarity with New York (and a lack of familiarity with other U.S. states) or to
prior experience with New York law. Or it could be due to a perception that New York is
a sophisticated jurisdiction with a highly developed body of commercial law and finance
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See, e.g., Prof’l Ins. Co. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 350 (Ala. 1997); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc.
v. Superior Court, 551 P.2d 1206, 1208-09 (Cal. 1976); Jacobson v. Mailboxes Etc. U.S.A., Inc., 646
N.E.2d 741, 743-44 (Mass. 1995); Micro Balanced Prods. Corp. v. Hlavin Indus. Ltd., 238 A.D.2d 284, 285
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
113
See generally Kimmo Mettälä, Governing-Law Clauses of Loan Agreements in International Project
Financing, 20 INT’L LAW. 219 (1986).
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law.114 Whatever the reasons, non-U.S. parties seem to be more comfortable agreeing to
New York law than to the laws of other, less familiar U.S. states, so if the non-U.S. party
is persuaded to agree to U.S. law, that often means, specifically, New York law.
Third, there is a statutory basis for the selection of New York law. There is a
New York statute that provides that “[t]he parties to any contract, agreement or
undertaking … may agree that the law of [New York] shall govern their rights and duties
in whole or in part, whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking bears a
reasonable relation to [the state of New York],” as long as the contract, agreement or
115
undertaking involves a transaction of at least $250,000 US Dollars.
From New York’s
perspective, there is no need for any relationship between such a transaction and the State
of New York for the parties to choose New York law.
2. Differences among U.S. States
For some aspects of a business transaction, the state whose law is selected might
matter a great deal, because some laws vary quite dramatically among U.S. states. For
example, some states within the United States offer varying degrees of protection to
certain kinds of sales intermediaries,116 and it is conceivable that a protective statute
could apply because of a choice-of-law clause when the protective statute would not have
otherwise applied by its terms. Also, enforcement of restrictive covenants is approached
very differently by different states within the United States. A covenant not to compete
might not be enforceable at all under one state’s laws and might be fully enforced under
another. The State of California, for example, is generally much less permissive of
covenants not to compete than other states.117
3. Uniformity among States: Article 2 of the UCC
When it comes to transactions involving sales of goods, whether the parties
choose to be governed by the law of the U.S. party’s home state, New York law, or the
law of some other U.S. jurisdiction (with the sole exception of Louisiana), it is unlikely to
make much difference for the body of substantive law governing the sales transaction. It
will not matter all that much because in each case, the transaction will be governed by
Article 2 of the UCC (together with Article 1 of the UCC),118 as adopted by the
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When New York enacted New York General Obligations Law Section 5-1401, it specifically “sought to
secure and augment its reputation as a center of international commerce.” Lehman Brothers Commercial
Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous Metals Trading Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 118, 136 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (citing Edith Friedler, Party Autonomy Revisited: A Statutory Solution To a Choice-of-Law Problem,
37 KAN. L. REV. 471, 497-98 (1989)).
115
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401(1).
116
See, e.g., Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, WIS. STAT. § 135.01 et seq.
117
See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (“Except as provided in this chapter, every contract by which
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void.”).
118
See U.C.C. § 1-102 (2011) (“This article applies to a transaction to the extent that it is governed by
another article of [the Uniform Commercial Code].”) (bracketed text in original).
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applicable state, and as supplemented by that state’s common law.119 Thus, if a
transaction is a sale of goods transaction that is to be governed by domestic U.S. law, it
probably will not matter all that much for the commercial aspects of the transaction
whether it is governed by the laws of Florida, New York, New Jersey, Wisconsin, or any
other U.S. state (other than Louisiana).120 If the parties to a transaction between Turkish
and U.S. buyers and sellers agree to opt for U.S. law (and to exclude the CISG), then for
a sale of goods, that means that Article 2 of the UCC, as codified in the relevant state and
as supplemented by that state’s common law, will govern.
V. COMPARING THE CISG AND ARTICLE 2 OF THE UCC
Of course, contracting parties should take advantage of freedom of contract to
decide for themselves how to allocate risk and responsibility, as discussed in Part x, infra.
But no matter how much time and energy the parties put into their carefully drafted
written agreement, there will always be a possibility that some unimagined contingency,
not addressed in the contract, materializes. And there may be some terms that the parties
simply do not take time to address expressly in the written agreement. When the
contingency materializes or the unaddressed terms become relevant and the parties find
themselves in dispute resolution, courts and other decision-makers will resort to
applicable law to supply terms the parties have not themselves supplied. 121 For the
Turkish practitioner who is counseling a client entering into a transaction with a U.S.
counterparty, there are several reasonable possibilities as to the law that could be selected
to fill the gaps left by the parties. Among these are domestic sales law of the
counterparty’s jurisdiction, Turkish domestic sales law, and the CISG. With respect to
transactions with U.S. contracting parties, it is therefore important to consider the
differences and similarities between the CISG and Article 2 of the UCC, as two
potentially applicable bodies of sales law, in order to make a good choice.122

119

See id. § 1-103(b) (“Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code],
the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other
validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.”) (bracketed text in original).
120
The State of Louisiana is unique among the fifty states in that Louisiana is a civil law jurisdiction, so it
presents a host of differences from other states of the United States. For that reason, U.S. practitioners
outside of Louisiana tend to avoid choosing the laws of Louisiana to govern their clients’ transactions.
121
For example, in Turkey the judge “is under a duty to apply Turkish choice-of-law rules and, sua sponte
to determine which foreign law should be applied in accordance with these rules.” Güngör, supra note x, at
3 (citing MÖHUK Art. 2/1). And the body of law to be applied “may govern the whole or a part of their
contract.” Id. at 6 (citing MÖHUK Art. 24/2). Similarly, under U.S. domestic sales law the “contract”
between the parties is defined to mean “the total legal obligation that results from the parties’ agreement as
determined by [the Uniform Commercial Code] as supplemented by any other applicable laws.” U.C.C. §
1-201(12) (2011) (bracketed text in original).
122
For the Turkish practitioner, it is also important to consider the differences between the CISG and
Turkish sales law. For a basic comparison of remedies under the CISG and remedies under Turkish law,
see Cagdas Evrim Ergun, Comparative Study on the Buyer’s Remedies Under the 1980 Vienna Sales
Convention
and
the
Turkish
Sales
Law
(2002),
available
at
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ergun.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
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A. Similarities
As some U.S. courts, as well as some commentators, have noted, there are
analogous provisions between the CISG and Article 2 of the UCC.123 Indeed, the
similarities between the CISG and the UCC contributed to the United States’ willingness
to ratify the CISG.124 In its report on the CISG, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations observed that “[the CISG] offers agreed substantive rules to govern the
formation of international sales contracts and the rights and obligations of the buyer and
seller that are in many respects similar to the concepts and approach of the U.S. Uniform
Commercial Code.”125
B. The Danger of Analogous Provisions
Nevertheless, it is a mistake to assume that similar provisions should be treated
the same. This view on the similarities between the CISG and Article 2 of the UCC,
whether correct or incorrect, has led to two harmful consequences relating to
interpretation of the CISG.
First, U.S. courts have not always looked carefully at the precise text of the CISG
itself, which courts are required by international law to do,126 and which is a fundamental
rule of statutory interpretation in the United States. Instead of focusing first on the text of
the treaty, U.S. courts have at times simply engaged in a UCC-like analysis of CISG
provisions the court believes to be analogous to provisions of Article 2 of the UCC.127
This seems to occur when no U.S. court has previously analyzed a CISG provision, and
the CISG provision looks similar to the UCC provision.
Second, focusing on UCC analysis of CISG provisions causes a U.S. court to fail
to fulfill its responsibility under Article 7(1) to interpret the CISG with regard for its
international character and “the need to promote uniformity in its application.”128
Uniformity in the application of the CISG will only occur if courts across borders
recognize their responsibility to consider how the CISG has been interpreted by courts in

123

See, e.g., Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v. Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 F. App’x 687, 691 (4th Cir. 2002);
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995); Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar
Petrochems., Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10559(AKH), 2011 WL 165404, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2011); Raw
Materials, Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., No. 03 C 1154, 2004 WL 1535839, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill.
July 7, 2004); see also JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG § 2.13 n.250 (3d ed. 2008).
124
See, e.g., Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Ronald Reagan, President
of the United States of Am. (Aug. 30, 1983), in S. Treaty Doc. No. 98-9, at vi (1983) (“It will be noted that
the Convention embodies the substance of many of the important provisions of the UCC and is generally
consistent with its approach and outlook.”).
125
S. EXEC. REP. NO. 99-20, at 1 (1986).
126
See Vienna Convention, supra note 62, art. 31 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.”) (emphasis added).
127
See, e.g., Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co., 37 F. App’x at 691; Raw Materials, Inc., 2004 WL 1535839 at
*3-4.
128
CISG, supra note 8, art. 7(1).
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other jurisdictions. Such recognition has happened only very little in the United States so
far.129
C. Important Differences
Moreover, while the CISG arguably bears some resemblance to Article 2 of the
UCC, it varies from Article 2 in some very important ways. 130 For example, under
Article 42 of the CISG the seller of the goods is deemed to give a warranty against
infringement, similar to the warranty against infringement that a merchant seller is
deemed to give under Section 2-312(3) of the UCC. But the non-infringement warranty
under the CISG is limited to third-party claims of which “the seller knew or could not
have been unaware” at the time of the conclusion of the contract.131 Under the UCC,
there is no knowledge requirement,132 making the potential scope of the seller’s
obligations significantly greater under the UCC, and the potential scope of the buyer’s
protection significantly less under the CISG, in respect of third-party infringement
claims.
1. The Role of the Writing and Determining Party Intent
There are some provisions of the CISG that are quite clearly different from
seemingly analogous provisions of the UCC, sometimes reflecting the influence of civil
law jurisdictions, for example. None represents a more important difference from the
UCC than that of Article 8.
To understand the importance of Article 8 and its departure from the U.S. legal
tradition, it is helpful to begin with the role of the writing in the United States. Section 2201 of the UCC contains the UCC statute of frauds, which establishes a writing
requirement for contracts for the sale of goods for a price of $500 or more.133 Article 11
of the CISG, on the other hand, specifically rejects any writing requirement or any other

129

For an example of a U.S. court considering in its analysis the reasoning of a foreign court, see Chicago
Prime Packers, Inc. v. Northam Food Trading Co., 320 F. Supp. 2d 702, 712-13 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
130
See, e.g., Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009
WL 818618, at *4-*5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009).
131
CISG, supra note 8, art. 42.
132
See U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (2011).
133
See U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2011). The common law also establishes a variety of statutes of frauds. See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 110 (1981). At least one such statute of frauds could be relevant for a
sale of goods transaction. See id. § 130. Notably, the UCC statute of frauds does not require the entire
agreement to be in writing; it merely requires a writing, which need not even be accurate or complete:
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price
of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties
and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or
broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed
upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of
goods shown in such writing.
U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2011).

© 2011 William P. Johnson

26

WPJ DRAFT – 8/18/2011

requirement as to form, providing that a contract “need not be concluded in or evidenced
by writing” in order to be enforceable and may instead be proved by any means.134
Similarly, in the United States when there is a written agreement, the “parol
evidence rule” makes it difficult or impossible to introduce evidence of the parties’ intent
from outside the four corners of that agreement.135 Under the parol evidence rule U.S.
courts will give significant deference to a written agreement when the agreement is
determined to be integrated.
The approach under the CISG is different. Specifically, courts are called upon to
consider “all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices
which the parties have established between themselves, usages and any subsequent
conduct of the parties” to determine the parties’ intent.136 Thus, even when there is a
written contract with contents that suggest a particular intent of the parties, the CISG
requires courts to consider evidence that could show that the parties nevertheless actually
intended something different from that indicated in the writing. This is an exercise that is
squarely outside the American legal imagination.
These U.S. concepts, and the underlying emphasis on putting a final agreement in
writing and deferring to that written agreement, are simply assumed by many U.S.
practitioners and courts. The CISG requires a different approach, reflecting a different
legal philosophy that tells us, whether correctly or incorrectly, that written agreements
should be viewed with some skepticism. And if the parties’ actual intent – which may be
contrary to the objective manifestation of intent evidenced by the writing – can be
determined, then the actual intent prevails over a contrary objective intent under the
CISG. This is a difference of significance between the CISG and Article 2 of the UCC
with respect to how a court will interpret the parties’ agreement.
2. Battle of the Forms
The failure of U.S. courts to conduct careful interpretation of CISG provisions in
light of their context has led to misunderstanding regarding both similar and dissimilar
provisions of the CISG. The battle of the forms, which is addressed under the UCC in
Section 2-207, provides an easy example of this.137 Section 2-207 of the UCC provides
for a contract to form even when an apparent acceptance of an offer contains terms that
are different from or in addition to the terms contained in the offer.138 This is a departure
from the “mirror image rule” of the common law, which would automatically treat such a
134

CISG, supra note 8, art. 11. Article 29 of the CISG further demonstrates the CISG’s rejection of
adherence to requirements as to form, in favor of considering extrinsic evidence, including conduct of the
parties, when determining the terms of the parties’ agreement. See id. art. 29. Specifically, Article 29
provides that even when a written contract contains a provision requiring any modification or termination
by agreement to be in writing, “a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a provision to
the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct.” Id. art. 29(2).
135
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 213 (1981); see also id. §§ 209 & 210; U.C.C. § 2-202
(2011).
136
See CISG, supra note 8, art. 8.
137
See U.C.C. § 2-207 (2011).
138
See id. § 2-207(1).
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purported acceptance as a counteroffer, which would operate as a rejection of the offer
and would be subject to acceptance before a contract would form. 139
Under the CISG the battle of the forms is addressed in Article 19. 140 It is
generally more difficult under Article 19 of the CISG than under Section 2-207 of the
UCC for a contract to form when a purported acceptance of an offer contains additional
or different terms, but it is marginally easier for a purported acceptance containing
additional terms to constitute an acceptance under the CISG than under the common law.
Yet, some U.S. courts have been unable to analyze formation under Article 19 without
resorting to American concepts.
With those distinctions between the two approaches in mind, a U.S. federal court,
in Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich International Corp., reasoned that Article 19(1) of the
CISG “reverses the rule of Uniform Commercial Code § 2-207, and reverts to the
common law rule ….”141 That is simply not correct. The CISG provisions dealing with
the battle of the forms take an approach that is different from both Section 2-207 of the
UCC and the mirror image rule of the common law.
Article 19(1) of the CISG at first blush appears to adopt a rule that is the
equivalent of the mirror image rule: “A reply to an offer which purports to be an
acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the
offer and constitutes a counter-offer.”142 If the CISG battle of the forms analysis ended
there, then the analysis would look very similar – perhaps equivalent – to the common
law analysis under the mirror image rule. But the CISG does not end there. The next
paragraph continues:
However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but
contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter the
terms of the offer constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without
undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that
effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the contract are the terms of
the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance.143
139

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 59 (1981) (“A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but
is conditional on the offeror’s assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an
acceptance but is a counteroffer.”).
140
Article 19 provides in relevant part:
(1) A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions,
limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counteroffer.
(2) However, a reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains
additional or different terms which do not materially alter the terms of the offer
constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror, without undue delay, objects orally to the
discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect. If he does not so object, the terms of the
contract are the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance.
CISG, supra note 8, art. 19.
141
Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
142
CISG, supra note 8, art. 19(1).
143
Id. art. 19(2).
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Thus, a contract can form under the CISG on the exchange of documents that are
not the mirror image of one another. That concept is similar to the concept set forth in
Section 2-207 of the UCC, but the language of Article 19 – and therefore the analysis that
is necessary and appropriate under Article 19 – is different from (and generally less
permissive than) the language of Section 2-207 of the UCC.
Moreover, if a contract does not form by the exchange of documents but the
parties behave as if there is a contract, then under Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 of the
UCC, the contract is made up of the terms on which the writings of the parties agree (if
any), together with supplementary terms under the UCC.144 That, too, is a departure from
the common law, where the “last shot rule” provides that whoever fired the last shot (that
is, sent the last offer) prior to performance typically wins the battle of the forms. This is
so because each counteroffer operates as a rejection of the previous offer.145 But at some
point one party performs and the other party acquiesces in the performance, signaling that
there is a contract between the parties. In the ordinary case under the common law, the
final counteroffer made – because it has not been rejected by a subsequent counteroffer –
is deemed to have been accepted by performance. 146 And the last shot that is fired would
win the battle of the forms under the common law. Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 of
the UCC changes that result, rejecting the last shot rule of the common law.
The CISG has no equivalent to Subsection (3) of Section 2-207 of the UCC, and it
might be easy to reach the conclusion that the CISG therefore adopts the common law
last shot rule. 147 That, too, is not correct.
There is provision in the CISG for acceptance by performance. 148 But the
provision identifies the limited circumstances when the offeree has the ability to indicate
assent to the offer by performance of an act, and the ability to accept by performance
under Article 18 exists only if it arises “by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices
which the parties have established between themselves or of usage ….”149 And if those
circumstances are not specifically present, then the last shot rule should not be used by a
court to conclude that the final counteroffer automatically constitutes the agreement
between the parties. Rather, the court should use other applicable provisions of the
CISG, including Article 8, to determine the intent of the parties, an exercise that does not
have an exact corollary in the American legal tradition.
3. Other Differences
There are numerous other differences between the CISG and Article 2 of the
UCC, including other rules of contract formation,150 the buyer’s right of rejection of
144

U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (2011).
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 39(2) (1981); see also id. § 36(1)(a).
146
See id. § 50(2).
147
See, e.g., Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009
WL 818618, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009).
148
See CISG, supra note 8, art. 18(3).
149
Id.
150
Compare U.C.C. §§ 2-204, 2-206 & 2-207 (2011) and CISG, supra note 8, arts. 18 & 19.
145
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nonconforming goods,151 and the remedies that are made available for breach, among
other things.
In addition to applying rules of treaty interpretation under international law, there
are two fundamental things that are essential for courts to do. First, courts must resist the
temptation simply to apply domestic law analysis to provisions of the CISG that appear to
the court to be analogous to provisions of domestic law. Second, courts must consider
how other courts in other jurisdictions have analyzed the CISG as one aspect of the
court’s own analysis. While courts are not bound by the decisions of foreign courts,
considering the analysis of foreign courts can greatly help to facilitate uniformity – and
therefore predictability – in the application of the CISG across borders.
D. Acknowledging the Differences
Ultimately, while the CISG resembles Article 2 of the UCC in some ways, the
CISG actually varies from Article 2 of the UCC in some very important ways.
Differences between the CISG and UCC Article 2 lead to different results, sometimes of
critical importance.
Fortunately, this simple truth has been recognized by some U.S. courts and
commentators.152 In Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Engineering & Consulting
GmbH, the court conducted a careful analysis of the CISG and its application to the facts
of that case in its consideration of a motion for partial summary judgment brought by the
plaintiff, a U.S. buyer, and a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendant, a
German seller.153 The dispute arose out of the sale to the U.S. buyer by the German seller
of a paper winding machine.154 Some of the issues before the court depended on the
terms of the contract between the parties. 155 However, the arrangement between the
parties involved a battle of the forms, and the exchange of documents that created the

151

Compare U.C.C. § 2-601 (2011) (requiring perfect tender by the seller or the buyer may reject the
goods) and CISG, supra note 8, arts. 70, 72 & 73 (requiring “fundamental breach” before certain remedies
are available to the buyer).
152
See, e.g., Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528, 531 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003)
(noting that the outcome under the CISG is different from the outcome that would likely have been
appropriate under Article 2 of the UCC); Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting
GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (“There are several
critical differences between the law governing contract formation under the CISG and the more familiar
principles of the Uniform Commercial Code.”); Filanto, S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229,
1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing that the CISG “varies from the Uniform Commercial Code in many
significant ways.”); Louis F. Del Duca & Patrick Del Duca, Selected Topics Under the Convention on
International Sale of Goods (CISG), 106 DICK. L. REV. 205, 207 (2001); see also Barbara Berry, S.A. de
C.V. v. Ken M. Spooner Farms, Inc., 254 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing district court’s grant
of summary judgment when the district court erred in failing to first analyze under the CISG the formation
of the underlying contract).
153
Miami Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL
818618, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009).
154
Id. at *1-*2.
155
Id. at *5-*8.
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battle of the forms therefore affected the formation of the contract between the parties
and, accordingly, its terms.156
In resolving the parties’ cross-motions, the court noted three specific differences
in respect of contract formation between the CISG and the UCC.157 First, the court
correctly recognized a difference with respect to the battle of the forms, though it
incorrectly characterized the difference, finding that, unlike the UCC, which has
abrogated the mirror image rule under Section 2-207, the CISG applies the mirror image
rule.158 Regrettably, the court failed to note that Article 19 of the CISG varies from the
common law mirror image rule, as discussed in Part x, supra.159 Second, the court noted
that the CISG has no statute of frauds.160 Third, the court noted that the CISG contains
no parol evidence rule and instead allows the court to consider statements or conduct to
establish, modify, or alter the terms of a contract.161 Thus, some U.S. courts have
recognized that the CISG is different from Article 2 of the UCC, and the analysis
required under the CISG is therefore also different.
E. Different Provisions – Different Outcomes
For courts and decision-makers, what is at stake? In addition to the clear problem
of failure to comply with requirements of international law, there is the practical
consideration that importing a domestic sales law analysis can lead to serious
consequences for one of the parties to a contract dispute governed by the CISG. One
poignant example of this is offered by Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. v.
Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 162
Beijing Metals & Minerals Import/Export Corp. (Beijing Metals) entered into a
business relationship with American Business Center, Inc. (ABC) for development of the
fitness equipment market in the United States and Canada. 163 Beijing Metals agreed to
manufacture goods for ABC to specification and in accordance with other
requirements.164 Initially, ABC paid in advance for each shipment.165 Eventually, the
parties changed the payment terms to 90-day payment terms, and ABC subsequently
defaulted on its payment obligations. 166 ABC and Beijing Metals agreed on a payment
plan, and in their written payment plan agreement, which the parties signed, ABC
acknowledged amounts owed and the parties established a payment schedule. 167

156

Id. at *1-*2.
Id. at *4-*5.
158
Id. at *4 (citing Article 19 of the CISG).
159
See id.
160
See id. at *5.
161
Id.
162
993 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1993)
163
See id. at 1179.
164
See id. at 1180.
165
See id.
166
See id.
167
See id.
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However, ABC asserted that there were also two oral agreements entered into
concurrently with the written payment plan. 168 Specifically, ABC claimed that Beijing
Metals also agreed that Beijing Metals, first, would ship goods to compensate for
nonconforming and defective goods and shortages, and second, would begin making
shipments on 90-day payment terms.169 Subsequently, the parties exchanged letters that
arguably offered evidence of those oral agreements.170
ABC eventually refused to make payments in accordance with the payment
schedule established by the payment agreement, and Beijing Metals filed a claim to
recover the amounts described in the payment agreement.171 ABC raised the defense that
its payment obligations under the payment agreement were only one part of a three-part
understanding, the other two parts consisting of the two claimed oral agreements, and
ABC further claimed that Beijing Metals was in breach of its obligations under the two
oral agreements.172 But the district court refused to allow evidence of the two claimed
oral agreements, concluding that the parol evidence rule prevented admission of evidence
of those agreements, thereby preventing the claimed oral agreements from being a
defense to ABC’s payment obligations under the payment agreement.173
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied the parol evidence rule under Texas common
law.
ABC argued for application of the CISG, while Beijing Metals argued for
(domestic) Texas law.175 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that it was not necessary to resolve
the choice-of-law issue, because the parol evidence rule of the Texas common law
“applies regardless.”176
174

Because the agreement at issue could reasonably be characterized simply as a
settlement agreement and not a contract of sale of goods for purposes of the CISG, it is
possible that a court could reasonably conclude that the CISG did not apply to the dispute
concerning nonpayment under the payment agreement. On the other hand, a court could
conclude that the payment agreement was one aspect of a larger sale of goods contract
that fell within the sphere of application of the CISG. If a court were to so conclude, then
the Fifth Circuit’s statement that the parol evidence rule “applies regardless” is incorrect,
as discussed in Part x, supra.177
In this case, there was evidence tending to show that the claimed oral agreements
actually had been entered into by the parties. 178 Such evidence included testimony of
ABC executives regarding the negotiations, a letter sent by Beijing Metals to ABC
following the negotiations, and two letters sent by ABC to Beijing Metals following the
168

See id.
See id.
170
See id. at 1180-81, n.5, n.6 & n.7.
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See id. at 1181.
172
See id. at 1182.
173
See id.
174
See id. at 1182-83.
175
See id. at 1182 n.9.
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Id.
177
Id.
178
See id. at 1180-81, n.5, n.6 & n.7.
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negotiations. 179 That evidence clearly would have been admissible under the CISG.180
Indeed, the court would have been required under Article 8(3) to give all of the evidence
“due consideration.”181
Under the parol evidence rule of Texas common law, the evidence was
excluded. 182 But under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 183 Article 8(3) of
the CISG, when applicable, prevails over the parol evidence rule of Texas common law,
and the parol evidence rule therefore would not have applied ‘regardless,’ as asserted by
the court. Unfortunately, the Fifth Circuit failed to recognize that and, as a consequence,
failed to engage in the analysis necessary to determine whether the dispute arose from a
mere settlement agreement that did not constitute a contract for the sale of goods for
purposes of the CISG or, instead, arose from one part of a contract of sale of goods,
making the CISG relevant for the analysis. 184
VI. ESTABLISHING CONTRACT TERMS BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT
Fortunately for Turkish and U.S. parties to sales transactions, one important
similarity between the CISG and the UCC is that both establish a broad freedom of
contract. With some important exceptions, parties are free to define for themselves their
contractual rights and duties and the terms of their contractual relationship. This is
especially important in the context of international business transactions, where the
parties are likely to encounter a complex web of local, national, foreign, and international
laws and regulations.
A. The Benefit of a Writing
In modern commercial transactions, the parties do not always take the time to
reduce to an integrated writing the terms of their agreement. The speed of a timesensitive transaction may make it impractical; the value of a low-value transaction may
make it cost ineffective; and the desire to preserve a perception of mutual trust may cause
some contracting parties to prefer a less formal arrangement.
Some transactions, on the other hand, more clearly justify the time and cost
necessary to finalize a written agreement that is mutually agreeable. This might be due to
the uncertainty surrounding the counterparty’s ability or willingness to perform; it could

179

See id.
See CISG, supra note 8, art.8(3); see also id. art 9(1).
181
Id. art. 8(3).
182
See 993 F.2d at 1182-83.
183
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
184
The court did reject by footnote an argument that the parol evidence rule of Article 2 of the UCC, rather
than the parol evidence rule of the Texas common law, was the appropriate parol evidence rule to apply.
See 993 F.2d at 1183 n.3. But it did so by conclusorily stating that the court would apply the parol
evidence rule developed by Texas common law “[b]ecause the [payment] agreement, on its face, is limited
to a payment schedule for overdue invoices, and more closely resembles a settlement agreement, as
opposed to a sale of goods.” Id. And the court engaged in no analysis to show that its conclusion was
sound.
180
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be due to a high-risk good constituting part of the transaction; it could be due to the value
of the transaction.
One clear justification for taking the time to enter into a written agreement is
when a sale of goods transaction is international, that is, when the buyer and seller have
their respective places of business in different countries. When that is the situation, then
the potential for risk and uncertainly increases exponentially due to the myriad of laws
that become relevant or potentially relevant for the transaction. One way that parties can
reduce uncertainty and allocate risk in a way that is sensible for that particular transaction
is by taking the time to enter into a robust written agreement.
B. The UCC Freedom of Contract and its Limits
The freedom of contract appears to be a familiar concept in Turkey, where parties
to international contracts generally have the freedom to choose the law that will govern
their contract, and where transactions are upheld whenever possible. 185 Similarly, the
United States has a reputation as a jurisdiction where contracting parties enjoy a broad
freedom of contract. And in fact, Article 1 of the UCC specifically provides that “the
effect of provisions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement.”186
The freedom of contract in the United States is not absolute, however. In fact, this is
made clear in the freedom of contract clause itself, which begins with the qualifier,
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided ….”187
1. Non-Derogable Provisions
Notably, the UCC’s obligations of “good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and
care” may not be disclaimed by agreement.188 Even so, the parties are permitted to
establish the standards by which performance of those obligations is to be measured, as
long as the standards the parties establish are not “manifestly unreasonable.”189
Similarly, notwithstanding the freedom of contract, some provisions of Article 2
are more difficult than others to vary. The most important examples arise in the context
of the seller attempting to place limits on the seller’s potential liability by means of
exclusions of warranties or disclaimers of damages.

185

See Güngör, supra note 98, at 6 (citing MÖHUK arts. 7 & 24/2).
U.C.C. § 1-302(a) (2011) (brackets in original). Although Article 2 of the UCC is the article that applies
to sale of goods transactions, Article 1 of the UCC also applies to a transaction, to the extent the transaction
is governed by any other article of the UCC, including Article 2. See id. § 1-102.
187
Id. § 1-302(a).
188
Id. § 1-302(b).
189
Id.
186
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2. Implied Warranties
Article 2 of the UCC establishes three implied warranties relating to the quality of
the goods sold, and the implied warranties may not be excluded by simple means. 190 The
implied warranty of merchantability, for example, is implied in all contracts for the sale
of goods when the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. 191 That means
that merchant sellers are deemed to have promised by contract that their goods are
merchantable. In order to be merchantable, goods must at least satisfy a list of
requirements, including that the goods must pass without objection in the trade under the
contract description, be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, and,
in the case of fungible goods, be of fair average quality within the description (among
other things).192 The list is non-exhaustive, and other attributes of merchantability could
arise by virtue of usage of trade or through case law.193
From the seller’s perspective, it is plain to see that inclusion of the implied
warranty of merchantability in a contract for the sale of goods could open the door to
potential liability for breach of warranty even when the goods conform to agreed-upon
specifications and are free from defects in material and workmanship, if the buyer can
persuade the decision-maker that the goods are nevertheless not merchantable for some
reason. Consequently, U.S. sellers tend to attempt to disclaim the implied warranty of
merchantability in order to reduce risk exposure and to increase certainty.
In fact, the implied warranty of merchantability may be excluded by contract, but
exclusion requires specific steps.194 If those steps are not followed, then the warranty has
not been excluded, no matter the freedom of contract.
Similarly, the UCC establishes an implied warranty that goods will be fit for a
buyer’s particular purpose for the goods, when the seller has reason to know the
particular purpose and also has reason to know that the buyer is relying on the seller’s
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.195 The particular purpose for the
goods differs from the ordinary purpose for the goods “in that it envisions a specific use
190

The UCC implied warranties are (1) the implied warranty of merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (2011),
(2) the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, id. § 2-315, and (3) implied warranties arising
from course of dealing or usage of trade, id. § 2-314(3).
191
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (2011). The UCC defines the term “Merchant” as follows:
“Merchant” means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed
by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
Id. § 2-104(1).
192
See id. § 2-314(2).
193
See id. § 2-314 official cmt. 6.
194
There are two ways to exclude by contractual agreement the UCC implied warranty of merchantability.
First, “to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous ….” Id. § 2-316(2). Second, all
implied warranties, including the implied warranty of merchantability, are excluded by expressions like ‘as
is’, ‘with all faults’ or other similar language. Id. § 2-316(3)(a).
195
Id. § 2-315.
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by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business ….”196 Thus, a seller might
furnish goods that are perfectly suitable for their ordinary purposes and nevertheless face
a claim for breach of warranty, if the buyer can show that the implied warranty of fitness
for particular purpose was made and breached. As a consequence, sellers tend to attempt
to exclude the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose as well.
In fact, the implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose may be excluded by
contract as well, but exclusion requires specific steps.197 And, like the implied warranty
of merchantability, if the steps are not followed, then the warranty is not excluded by
contract.
3. Express Warranties
In addition to implied warranties, the UCC also provides for express
warranties. 198 Express warranties can arise from promises made by the seller to the buyer
that relate to the goods, affirmations of fact made by the seller to the buyer that relate to
the goods, descriptions of the goods, and samples or models of the goods, in each case,
when made part of the basis of the bargain. 199 Once made, an express warranty cannot be
disclaimed.200 Of course, an express warranty made as part of a negotiation could be
bargained away prior to finalization of the agreement. But if not bargained away, then
Section 2-316(1) of the UCC provides that when both an express warranty and a
purported disclaimer of the express warranty are part of the agreement between the
parties and the two terms cannot be reconciled, the express warranty will prevail over the
purported disclaimer.201 However, if the express warranty was made separate from an
integrated writing, then the buyer has the practical difficulty of overcoming the parol
evidence rule in order to prove that the express warranty was made, an unlikely – if not
impossible – prospect.202
4. Warranty of Title
Finally, the UCC also establishes a warranty of title, a warranty that is especially
difficult to modify or exclude. 203 A general disclaimer of implied warranties will not
196

Id. § 2-315 official cmt. 2.
There are two ways to exclude by contractual agreement the UCC implied warranty of fitness for
particular purpose. First, “to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a
writing and conspicuous.” Id. § 2-316(2). Second, all implied warranties, including the implied warranty
of fitness for particular purpose, are excluded by expressions like ‘as is’, ‘with all faults’ or other similar
language. Id. § 2-316(3)(a).
198
Id. § 2-313.
199
Id. § 2-313(1).
200
See id. § 2-316(1).
201
See id.
202
See id.; see also id. § 2-202.
203
Article 2 of the UCC establishes the following warranty of title:
Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty by the seller that (a) the
title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and (b) the goods shall be delivered
free from any security interest or other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the
time of contracting has no knowledge.
U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (2011).
197
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disclaim the warranty of title, and even an “as is, with all faults” clause will not disclaim
the warranty of title under ordinary circumstances.204 Rather, exclusion of the warranty
of title occurs only by two possible means:
A warranty [of title] will be excluded or modified only by specific
language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason to know that
the person selling does not claim title in himself or that he is purporting to
sell only such right or title as he or a third person may have.205
Thus, to disclaim the warranty of title requires either “specific language” or
existence of the rather limited circumstances that specifically give the buyer reason to
know that the person selling does not claim title.206 Such limited circumstances include
“sales by sheriffs, executors, certain foreclosing lienors and persons similarly situated”
when made out of the ordinary commercial course in a way that makes their peculiar
character immediately apparent to the buyer.207
5. Disclaiming Damages
One common method used by U.S. sellers to limit potential liability is by
disclaiming certain categories of damages. The UCC specifically provides for recovery
by an aggrieved buyer of not only direct damages, but also incidental damages and
consequential damages.208 Such damages can be quite large, when an aggrieved buyer
claims lost profits, for example.209 As a consequence, U.S. sellers frequently disclaim
both categories of damages, and the UCC provides for such disclaimer. 210 But the
seller’s freedom to disclaim consequential damages is another example of a freedom that
is not absolute under the UCC.211 Specifically, while the seller may disclaim
consequential damages as a general rule, such a disclaimer is not effective if the
purported limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. 212 And any purported limitation of
consequential damages for personal injury in the case of consumer goods is prima facie
unconscionable.213

204

See id. § 2-312 official cmt. 6 (“The warranty [of title] is not designated as an ‘implied’ warranty, and
hence is not subject to Section 2-316(3). Disclaimer of the warranty of title is governed instead by
subsection (2) [of Section 2-312], which requires either specific language or the described
circumstances.”).
205
Id. § 2-312(2) (emphasis added).
206
See id.
207
Id. official cmt. 5.
208
See id. §§ 2-712(2), 2-713(1), & 2-714(3).
209
See id. § 2-715. Incidental damages can include “expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt,
transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, any commercially reasonable charges,
expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to
the delay or other breach.” Id. § 2-715(1). Consequential damages can include any foreseeable loss
resulting from the seller’s breach, as well as any “injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty,” whether foreseeable or not. Id. § 2-715(2).
210
See id. § 2-719(1)(a).
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See id. § 2-719(3).
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Each of these permitted limitations on the seller’s liability or potential liability
may be accomplished by express clauses in the parties’ agreement, but only if the
statutory requirements are satisfied. If the statutory requirements are not satisfied, then,
notwithstanding the freedom of contract and the actual intent of the parties, a court is
likely to conclude that the clauses are simply ineffective.
C. Freedom of Contract under the CISG
Like the UCC, the CISG explicitly establishes a broad freedom of contract, a
point that was not lost on the United States. In transmitting the CISG to the U.S. Senate
for its advice and consent following U.S. signature of the CISG, President Ronald Reagan
noted that, “[w]orthy of emphasis is the international deference that the Convention
accords to the contract made by the parties to an international sale. The parties may
agree that domestic law rather than the Convention will apply, and their contract may
modify or supplant the Convention’s rules.” 214 Indeed, Article 6 of the CISG provides
that the parties to any contract governed by the CISG may, subject to Article 12,
“derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”215
Unlike the UCC’s broad categories of non-derogable terms of good faith,
reasonableness, and the like, the CISG’s non-derogable provisions are quite limited.
Specifically, Article 12 establishes the fundamental non-derogable terms of the CISG:
Any provision of article 11,216 article 29217 or Part II218 of this Convention
that allows a contract of sale or its modification or termination by
agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication of intention to be
made in any form other than in writing does not apply where any party has
his place of business in a Contracting State which has made a declaration
under article 96 of this Convention. 219 The parties may not derogate from
or vary the effect of this article. 220
Neither Turkey nor the United States has made a declaration under Article 96,221
so the fundamental non-derogable provision of the CISG is not even applicable for sales
214

Letter of Transmittal, supra note 58, at iii.
CISG, supra note 8, art. 6 (emphasis added).
216
“A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject to any other
requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.” Id. art. 11.
217
Article 29(1) provides that “[a] contract may be modified or terminated by the mere agreement of the
parties.” Id. art. 29(1). Paragraph (2) of Article 29 continues:
A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification or
termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified or terminated
by agreement. However, a party may be precluded by his conduct from asserting such a
provision to the extent that the other party has relied on that conduct.
Id. art. 29(2).
218
Part II of the CISG is concerned with formation of the contract. See id. pt. II.
219
Article 96 allows Contracting States to declare that domestic writing requirements, such as a domestic
statute of frauds, will be effective, notwithstanding the terms of the CISG that reject writing requirements.
See id.
220
Id. art. 12.
221
See CISG Status, supra note 40.
215
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transactions between Turkish and U.S. contracting parties. Thus, the CISG offers the
parties great freedom of contract.
Moreover, the CISG simply does not contain the same hurdles to modification of
certain important terms, such as warranty terms, that the UCC contains. On the contrary,
in the warranty provisions of the CISG, the CISG expressly contemplates modification by
the parties without establishing any particular means of modification: “Except where the
parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform to the contract unless they
[satisfy the list of requirements established by Article 35].”222
Now, if the parties draft their written agreement carefully and are mindful of the
hurdles created by domestic sales law, such as the relevant provisions of the UCC, then
the same effect can be achieved under U.S. domestic sales law (with respect to exclusion
of warranties under Article 2 of the UCC, for example) as can be achieved under Article
6 (and Article 35(2)) of the CISG. But varying the provisions of applicable law is less
complicated under the CISG, and there is generally less risk of an ineffective disclaimer
or an unenforceable term under the CISG than under the UCC.223
D. The Risk of Invalidity under the UCC
In addition to the risk that a contract clause might be deemed to be ineffective
because it fails to follow a prescribed formula or otherwise to satisfy a statutory
requirement, there is a distinct parallel risk under the UCC that some allocations of risk
or assignments of responsibility might be deemed simply to be invalid, usually because of
the circumstances under which the contract was entered into. There are essentially two
ways that a contract, or an agreed-upon contract clause, can be rendered unenforceable by
a court under Article 2 of the UCC: if it is deemed by the court to be unconscionable, or
if an equitable principle renders it invalid.
1. Unconscionability
With respect to the doctrine of unconscionability, Article 2 of the UCC provides
as follows:

222

CISG, supra note 8, art. 35(2).
For a contrary view, see LOOKOFSKY, supra note 123, 165 (“The validity (enforceability) of a standard
term which (e.g.) purports to disclaim the obligations set forth in Article 35(2) and/or limit liability in the
event of breach is a question outside the CISG: the Convention is simply ‘not concerned with’ the validity
of clauses like these.”). This view of the CISG is not supported by its text. It is true that the CISG is not
concerned with the validity of the contract or of any of the contract’s provisions. See CISG, supra note 8,
art. 4. But that is so with respect to the validity of any clause in the contract; there is no special treatment
accorded to clauses purporting to limit either party’s liability. Indeed, the CISG contemplates in other
sections of the CISG that a contract could include such a clause. See, e.g., id. art. 19(3) (addressing how a
contract term relating to the “extent of one party’s liability to the other” should be analyzed in the battle of
the forms). The explanatory note supports this as well: “[W]hen a question concerning a matter governed
by this Convention is not expressly settled in it, the question is to be settled in conformity with the general
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settled in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.” Id.,
Explanatory Note, ¶ 14.
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If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.224
In practice, a finding of unconscionability is rare, especially in a business
transaction that does not involve a consumer buyer. Some courts require a finding of
both procedural and substantive unconscionability for unconscionability to be found. 225
And regardless, the various standards used by U.S. courts in different jurisdictions tend to
be quite high. 226
Nevertheless, it is important to be aware that the doctrine exists under the UCC,
which leaves the door open for a court to refuse to enforce a contract clause that was
agreed upon by the parties, but that one party comes to regret, if the regretful party can
persuade the court that the clause is unconscionable.
2. Equitable Principles of Invalidity
Second, the UCC expressly incorporates supplementary equitable principles
pertaining to validity and invalidity, to the extent not displaced by particular provisions of
the UCC:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the [Uniform Commercial
Code], the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel,
fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and other
validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions.227
Thus, the UCC specifically contemplates the possibility of invalidation of a
contract, in whole or in part, under the doctrine of unconscionability, as well as under
traditional equitable principles of invalidity, such as fraud.
E. Invalidity and the CISG
The CISG by contrast does not itself expressly provide for the possibility of
invalidation of a contract, in whole or in part, under the doctrine of unconscionability or
any other principle. This makes sense, at least to some extent, because the CISG does not
apply to consumer transactions. That is, the CISG excludes from its sphere of application
224

U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445, 449-50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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agreement is one which no sane man not operating under a delusion would make and … no honest man
would take advantage of.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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contracts for the sale of goods “bought for personal, family or household use,” unless the
seller did not know and ought not to have known the goods were purchased for the
personal, family or household use. 228 Article 2 of the UCC, on the other hand, applies to
all sales of goods, including sales of goods to consumer buyers, and no matter the use for
which the goods are purchased.229 Because the CISG applies by its terms only to nonconsumer goods transactions, there is less need for paternalistic interference in the
bargain struck by the parties. 230
On the other hand, the CISG provides that “it is not concerned with (a) the
validity of the contract or any of its provisions ….”231 And the CISG further provides for
questions concerning matters not settled by the CISG to be settled by the law applicable
by virtue of the rules of private international law.232 That could allow principles of
domestic law relating to the validity of the contract or any of its provisions, such as the
doctrine of fraud, to supplement the CISG.
Still, any such domestic doctrine of invalidity should be applied (if at all) only
after the applicable provisions of the CISG, including Articles 6, 8 and 9, among others,
have been considered and applied. But if a case for fraud can be made, then the CISG
would not prevent a court from concluding that the contract is invalid, nor should it.
F. Balancing Freedom of Contract and Finality of the Writing
In short, both the CISG and the UCC afford the parties a very broad freedom of
contract. The UCC creates some hurdles that must be cleared for effectiveness of certain
clauses, especially those that purport to limit the seller’s potential liability. But the
attentive practitioner can clear those hurdles by means of careful drafting, and in such a
case, the statutory requirements under the UCC that must be satisfied in order to take
advantage of the freedom of contract should not matter all that much.
On the other hand, there is greater risk under the CISG that the writing –
including a writing that has been carefully drafted by both parties – will be disregarded in
favor of some subjective intent, if one party is able to show to the court’s satisfaction that
the claimed subjective intent was shared by the parties. When a written agreement is well
drafted and complete, that aspect of the CISG should not play a significant role, as the
written agreement itself ought to offer the very best evidence of the parties’ mutual
subjective intent. But the risk (or opportunity, depending on the perspective of the party)
exists nevertheless.
At the same time, while a Turkish commercial lawyer who values the certainty
offered by a robust written agreement might legitimately be concerned about the
228
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uncertainty presented by Article 8 of the CISG, the ability to introduce extrinsic evidence
under the CISG could cut in favor of a Turkish contracting party, especially when the
memory of the U.S. contracting party is faulty. For example, if the parties use the U.S.
contracting party’s standard form as part of their written agreement and the standard form
does not represent in a complete way the agreed-upon terms, then the CISG will
generally allow the Turkish contracting party a better chance of showing that the form is
inaccurate or incomplete, and that the parties actually shared some different intent.
All of the foregoing shows that a careful decision as to choice of law should be
made for each international sales transaction that a Turkish buyer or seller enters into, a
decision that should be based on the facts and circumstances of that transaction.
CONCLUSION
“Turkey is a democratic, secular, unitary, constitutional republic, with an ancient
cultural heritage …”233 and is an important friend to and trading partner with the United
States. Even without a common legal framework in place, trade in goods between the
two countries has been robust. Now that Turkey is a party to the CISG, predictability in
the context of sales of goods should increase and transaction costs should decrease.
Moreover, Turkey’s accession to the CISG is an important step toward ongoing
harmonization of Turkey’s laws relating to international trade and its integration into the
international system of trade and commerce. It is an important contribution to the goal of
removal of legal barriers to trade and promotion of the ongoing development of trade.
But accession is only the first step Turkey must take in order to fully realize the
benefits of becoming a party to the CISG. Three additional things must occur for
Turkey’s accession to be meaningful and to bear fruit.
First, the Turkish bar must become familiar with the CISG and must become
familiar with the differences between the CISG, on the one hand, and Turkish domestic
sales law or other domestic sales laws, such as the United States’ UCC, on the other
hand. Only by becoming familiar with the CISG and the differences it offers will the
Turkish bar be in a position to render thoughtful and effective advice regarding whether
or not to exclude the CISG on a case-by-case basis.
Second, the Turkish bench and other decision-makers, such as arbitrators, must
interpret and apply the CISG faithfully. Not only are Turkish courts required to do so by
international law, but it is essential that they – and U.S. courts, for that matter – do so, to
make their respective contributions to the continuing development of the legal framework
necessary to facilitate efficient, predictable, and mutually beneficial trade and commerce.
Third, Turkish law schools must play their part in facilitating understanding of the
CISG by preparing tomorrow’s members of the bar to give their clients good advice and
by preparing tomorrow’s members of the bench to render good decisions, thus propelling
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Turkey steadfastly along its path of meaningful engagement with the international system
of trade and commerce.
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